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Lauer: Jury Agreement and the General Verdict in Criminal Cases

JURY AGREEMENT AND THE GENERAL VERDICT
IN CRIMINAL CASES
The hypothetical defendant is on trial for stealing a car. He is charged
with purloining the vehicle either by stealth or by force. He is accused of
taking the automobile either with intent permanently to deprive the
rightful owner or knowing the vehicle to be stolen. The 1957 Chevy van in
question belongs to either Peter Wimsey or Death Bredon.
It is clear that in order to convict our defendant, the jury must reach
agreement as to his guilt.' It is less clear just what else the jury must agree
upon. Typcially, a jury returns a general verdict of guilty, which indicates
that the jury found all the elements of the crime. In the hypothetical problem, the jury is presented with three sets of alternatives. Unless the jury is
instructed that it must find at least one alternative in each set, it is possible
that the jury might convict without agreement. The difficulty with such a
result is obvious. The defendant might be charged simply: taking the vehicle by force, with intent to permanently deprive the rightful owner, Peter
Wimsey. In such a case, the jury would be instructed that it can convict
only if it finds that the prosecution has proved each item. If the jury failed
to reach agreement on any of these, it could not convict. There is no
justification for a different result when alternatives are injected into the
process.
Whenever a jury is permitted to return a general verdict of guilty to a
charge which contains alternatives, either one of which will suffice, it is
possible that all the jury will not have found the same alternative. If all
members of the jury have not agreed to find at least one of the alternatives
2
necessary to convict, a unanimous verdict has not been returned.
Likewise, if a majority verdict is permitted and the requisite majority have
not agreed on at least one alternative, a majority verdict has not been
returned. 3
Despite this startingly clear proposition, a great number of courts
allow an uninstructed jury to return a general verdict where alternatives
are alleged. A simple instruction, given whenever alternatives are charged,
that in order to convict the jury must agree that at least one alternative has
been proved would insure the jury agreement to which the defendant is entitled. It would also reduce the burden on the criminal justice system by
eliminating needless new trials.
1. In serious criminal matters, a jury trial is regarded as a hallowed right, the proud boast of
a free society and a national commitment against arbitrary law enforcement. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
2. Jury unanimity was not always considered essential, but by the eighteenth century was
well established. 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1139 (T. Cooley 4th ed. 1899). The
origins of jury unanimity requirements are uncertain, but see Comment, Jury Unanimity: Historical Accident or Safeguard of the Accused? Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972), 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 388, 388-389 (1973) for a collection of interesting hypotheses.
3. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution has been held to guarantee the
right to a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal cases. Andres v. United States, 333
U.S. 740, 748 (1948). The requirement of the sixth amendment of unanimous jury verdicts in federal criminal cases does not apply to the states. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Nonetheless, many states require
unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials by virtue of state constitutional or
statutory provisions.
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The problem of general verdicts on alternatives arises in many different kinds of cases. Before moving to a discussion of these cases and a
comparison of the proper approach with the approaches of the various
courts, two background items need mention.
Jury Agreemeant v. Jury Unanimity
Most courts which have considered the question have agreed that some
general verdicts on alternatives violate the defendant's right to a
unanimous jury verdict. Many of these cases discuss the relationship of jury
agreement to jury unanimity. Certainly this is an appropriate concern
where jury unanimity is required. It is to be noted, however, that the problem is no less acute when a majority verdict is available. Even if a majority
verdict is permitted, a certain number or percentage of jurors must agree.
Under such circumstances, the possibility exists that less than the requisite
majority will find one alternative. The concern here is not so much whether
the jury must be unanimous, but on what the jury must agree before
rendering its verdict.
General verdicts on alternatives are problematic even where jury
unanimity is not required. Most jurisdictions which allow a majority verdict
specify the number of jurors which must concur. In the same way that one
cannot be certain all members of the jury agreed on at least one alternative
where unanimity is required, one cannot be sure that the requisite number
agreed upon one alternative to reach the majority verdict, unless the proper instruction is given. If, for example, a 10/12 majority is required, and
no instruction warns that ten jurors must agree on at least one alternative,
six may have found one alternative and six another. Thus the necessary
agreement of ten for a majority verdict would not be met.
Sanctity of the Verdict
Some courts approve the general verdict on alternatives when logic dictates they ought not. Perhaps this reflects the long-held assumption that it
is improper to look into or behind the jury verdict. The courts are hesitant
to look behind the jury verdict and wish to avoid intermeddling with the
jury of peers interposed between the citizen accused of crime and the
machinery of the state. 4 The public has a strong interest in protecting the
secrecy of the jury deliberation, in promoting the finality and stability of
verdicts, and in protecting the jurors from harassment.5 At common law,
the jury verdict was not expected to be any more rational than the ordeals
it replaced. 6 The Supreme Court has held that even though a unanimous
verdict may be the result of compromise or7leniency, it cannot be upset by
"speculation or inquiry into such matters." The judge's mere inquiry into
the numerical division of a jury having difficulty reaching agreement is
seen as coercive and as undermining the jury process. Thus in the federal
and some state systems the practice is forbidden, 8
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See Kornstein, Impeawhment ofPartialVerdicts, 54 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 663, 669 (1980).
Id. at 669-70.
United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902-903 (2d Cir. 1960).
Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932).
See Note, Criminal Procedure-Ellis v. Reed: Constitutionality and Coerciveness of
JudicialInquiry into the Numerical Divisionof a Jury, 58 N.C.L. REv. 379 (1980).
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Overview
The courts which have considered the propriety of a general verdict on
alternative charges have not reached consensus on just what the jury must
agree about. At the one extreme, it is clear that the jury must all agree who
the murder victim was. 9
In some cases any of a number of acts would satisfy a particular
criminal statute. In these cases, the courts generally agree that the jury
must agree just what the defendant did. Even here, however, exceptions
have been drawn not requiring unanimity as to the act of the acts alleged
are not conceptually distinct.
At the other extreme, the courts have generally said that the jury need
not agree on means the defendant used. The primary problem here is one of
classification-determining whether the thing in question is an act, a
means, or something else. The courts have not been consistent in their
characterizations. The knottier cases involve liability which is not
necessarily predicated on a criminal act of the defendant (principal/accomplice; conspiracy). Another difficult area is where alternative mental
states are alleged.
A return to the hypothetical may help demonstrate that the lines drawn
by the courts which have considered what the jury must agree upon are not
clear. An application of the results reached by most courts would reveal the
following expected conclusion: the jury would have to agree from whom the
vehicle was stolen, but need not agree whether it was taken by force or by
stealth, nor whether the defendant intended permanently to deprive the
owner or knew the vehicle was stolen. The result is anamolous. It is clear
that if the defendant were accused only of using force, and the jury did not
agree force was used, they could not convict.
In light of the difficulty the courts are having classifying the alternatives and in light of the expense and time of new trials where error has
been committed, the prudent route is to instruct the jury in every case
where alternatives are alleged that it can convict only if all (or the requisite
majority) agree that at least one of the alternatives has been established.

ACTS

The consensus is that when the commission of more than one act will
satisfy the statutory prohibition, the jury must agree which act the defen9. In fact, this proposition is so clear it appears never to have been drawn in question. A
diligent search has turned up no case even addressing this type of alternative. An early
Missouri case did, however, indicate that a general guilty verdict to charges of an illegal
sale might be approved when it was unclear to whom the jury decided the sale was made.
State v. Geist, 196 Mo.App. 393,195 S.W. 1050, concurring opinion reported at 199 S.W.

1041 (1917).
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dant did. 10 Most courts refuse to permit the general verdict when the
defendant has been prosecuted under a statute which provides that any one
of several acts is sufficient to constitute the offense. In such cases, the jury
must agree that the defendant committed at least one act which the statute
proscribes. "Where a criminal defendant is charged under a statute which
can be violated by any one of several distinct acts, the possibility arises that
the jurors will agree that the defendant has done something illegal and thus
is guilty, without agreeing which act the defendant committed."" Unless
the jury agreed what the defendant did, it would not be possible for them to
convict. If some believed the defendant had done one act, some a second,
some a third act, the defendant is not guilty of the crime charged. The jury
must be unanimous that the defendant committed at least one act the
statute proscribes.
A recent exception has been made to this rule by the fifth circuit in
United States v. Gipson.21 If the acts which would satisfy the statute are not
conceptually distinct, then the jury need not agree. The fifth circuit conceded that the jury must agree on which act the defendant did before it could
find the defendant guilty of the crime charged.' 3 The statute in question
provided six acts which could constitute the crime: receiving, concealing,
storing, bartering, selling, or disposing of a stolen vehicle moving in interstate traffic. 14 The fifth circuit refused to accept the proposition that
"since every juror was still required to find all elements of the charged offense present in order to convict the defendant, there was necessarily
unanimous jury agreement as to his guilt."1 5 The Gipson court rejected the
argument that because all six acts could be found from the evidence, jury
unanimity was satisfied. Rather, the court followed the general rule that
the jury must agree on what act the defendant did, and said that the fact
that all of the alternatives were supported by the evidence reinforced the
conclusion that there may have been a jury rift. 16
However, the court departed from the general rule which would require jury unanimity as to which of the six acts the defendant did in one
significant respect. The court examined the six acts and discovered that
there were two conceptual groupings of acts, either one of which would
constitute the prohibited criminal conduct.' 7 The first group consisted of
receiving, concealing, and storing. The second group was composed of
bartering, selling, and disposing. The court held that the jury must be
unanimous as to which one of the two groups of acts the defendant did, but
that the jury need not be unanimous as to the specific kind of act within
10. State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501, 508 (1980); People v. Nichols, 112 Cal. App.
3d 249, 169 Cal. Rptr. 497, 511 (1980); State v. Bryan, 120 Kan. 763, 245 P. 102, 104
(1926); People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989, 989 (1903); State v. Hazelett, 8 Or.
App. 44, 492 P.2d 501, 503 (1972); State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P.2d 153, 156
(1946); State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d 731, 736 (1974); Holland v. State,
91 Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288, 293 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1979).
11. Note, Right to Jury Unanimity on Material Fact Issues: United States v. Gipson, 91
HARv. L. REv. 499, 499 (1977).
12. 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).
13. Id. at 458.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 457.
16. Id. at 459.
17. Id. at 458.
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each group."' Within each group the prohibited acts were so closely related
and indistinguishable that the jury need not agree to the particular
characterization of an act, which they all agreed was done. Receiving, concealing and storing all might well describe a single act and the jury needn't
agree on the label to be used. Nor need the jury agree whether the particular label bartering, selling, or disposing is most appropriate. On the
other hand, the court said that the two conceptual groupings of acts were
so distinct that the jury should be required to decide which group of acts
was done."1
In addition, requiring unanimity as to which group of acts was done
would ensure essential agreement on what the defendant did.20 The court
acknowledged there could be essential agreement on what act the defendant did without splitting hairs over the characterization within each
group. Only when there was essential agreement on what the defendant did
could the jury decide that the actus reus element of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The net result of the Gipson decision is to
qualify the general rule that the jury must agree what act was done by retuiring jury unanimity concerning conceptually distinct acts only. Thus,
t e area of necessary agreement is reduced.
Within the fifth circuit itself, Gipson has been used to further reduce
the acts a jury must agree upon.21 Even with the Gipson exception the
general rule remains: where one or more separate and distinct acts will
satisfy a criminal statute the jury must agree on which act was done. The
rationale appears to lie in the requirement of jury unanimity and the right
of the defendant to have every element proved against him beyond a
reasonable doubt.22
Some states have adopted the Gipsontest for when the jury must agree
on what the defendant did. 23 One state has given Gipson a very narrow
reading. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in State v.Utter, limited Gipson
to the Gipson facts: the trial court had specifically authorized a nonunanimous verdict after the jury requested additional instructions.2 4 The
Gipson standard utilizing conceptually distinct groupings has also been
criticized as being difficult to apply:
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 457.
21. United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1202, reh'g denied (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 949, cert. denied sub noa. Maynard v. United States, 455 U.S. 991
(1982) (RICO conviction on general verdict upheld ebcause the acts charged were not
distinguished in any significant respect, because the evidence as to each was remarkably
similar and thus the acts comprised one conceptual group); United States v. Freeman,
619 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981) (mail fraud and interstate transportation of fraudulently taken property not two conceptual groupings);
United States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 326, n.4 (5th Cir. 1977) (in prosecution on one count
of conspiracy to violate two separate statutes, general verdict upheld; there was no
dispute over what acts Bolts did).
22. Many of the cases discuss the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and relate
the necessity
for and
agreement
toit. Ofhas
course,
relationship between proof beyond
reasonable
doubt
y unanimity
long the
been debated. The principal point here isa
jury is required to reach agreement
The
is.
of
the standard
not what
that it
and
it matters
must agree
regardless of whether the standard of proof is beyond a
reasonable
doubt, clear and convincing, or a preponderance. The question is what the jury must
agree about.
23. Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288,293, recon. denied (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 931 (1980).
24. 92 N.M. 83, 582 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1978).
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Other jurisdictions are also having difficulty in explaining the application of Gipson to the particular case. All agree that jury
unanimity is required, but substantial doubt exists as to what the
jury has to be unanimous about.... Conceptual groupings, while
dependent to an extent on the statutory language, are also dependent upon the facts in evidence. This makes the Gipson analysis difficult to apply.... And when the evidence is insufficient to warrant
an instruction on one of the alternative ways of committing a
crime, the instruction should not refer to that alternative.2 5
MEANS
Some statutes provide that a single offense may be committed in more
than one way. In such cases, the courts tend to decide that jury agreement
is not necessary. The courts which have adopted this view have variously
such statutes present as "ways," '2 6 "methods," 2
described28the alternatives
"means," "elements," 2 9 "modes,"3 0 "theories of the participation, "8' of
"views of the transaction. '3 2 The terminology is unimportant. The judgment the terminology expresses is important, for it removes these alternatives from the realm of necessary jury agreement. This posture is rationalized in several ways.
Not Essential Elements
One justification for the position that the jury need not agree is that the
means are not essential elements of the crime. In State v. Baldwin,33 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court was confronted with a case in which compulsion
(use of force) was an element of the crime of sexual assault. The jury was instructed it could find that element if it found use or threat of force and
violence.3 4 The court explained that the nature of the compulsion does not
change because it results from a raised fist, rather than a blow."5 The court
concluded that the two methods of satisfying the force component were of
sufficient conceptual similarity to comprise but one element of the crime.8 6
The court found support for its position in the legislative attempt to express a notion of generalized force, rather than to require a specialized finding of use or threat of force. 3 7 Thus, the use of force is an element of the
crime which the jury must find. So long as there is agreement that force
was used, the jury need not agree on how the force was employed, because
only its use, not how it was used, is an element of the crime charged. This
25. Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 304 N.W.2d 729, 738-42 (1981) (Abrahamson, J., con-

curring.

26. State v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501, 508 (1980).
27. State v. Baldwin, 101 Wis. 2d 441, 304 N.W.2d 742, 747 (1981).
28. State v. Bryan, 120 Kan. 763, 245 P. 102, 104 (1926); State v. Wixon, 30 Wash. App. 63,
631 P.2d 1033, 1042 (1981); Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W. 288, 291 (1979),

cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980).
29. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978).
30. State v. Green, 91 Wash. 2d 431, 588 P.2d 1370, 1377 (1979).
31. Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d at 293.
32. People v. Sullivan, 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989, 989 (1903).
33. 101 Wis. 2d 441, 304 N.W.2d 742 (1981).
34. 304 N.W.2d at 745.
35. Id. at 748.
36. Id. Note the apparent application of the Gipson rationale.
37. Id.
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explanation is quite unsatisfactory. If the jury has not agreed on what the
defendant did, it is not possible for them to find even the element of
generalized force. To require the jury to agree that the defendant either
threatened or used force, or both, would "not require it to split hairs over
nomenclature." 38
The Kansas Supreme Court, in an early case, also failed to recognize
that a finding of an element of a crime must rest on basic agreemerit as to
what the defendant did. In State v. Bryan,39 the defendant had been charged with extortion. The statute defined a single offense, but listed several
ways in which the element of intimidation might be accomplished. In ruling
on a motion to quash, the trial court indicated it would feel compelled to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous on how the intimidation was committed or else the verdict would not be unanimous. 40 The supreme court
disagreed, and decided that a crime would have been committed regardless
of how the intimidation was effected. "There must be unanimity that extortion was committed or attempted through intimidation, and that is as far as
the court is required to go in the instructions as to unanimity in the mental
operations of the jurors in reaching a verdict. "41 The Kansas court failed to
grasp the point that unless the jurors agree what the defendant did, they
are not in a position to evaluate whether that conduct satisfies the requisite
element of intimidation.
Equal Liability
Another theory supporting the conclusion that agreement need not be
reached on alternatives is based on the fact that both alternatives result in
equal criminal liability. The first degree murder cases where the alternatives alleged are premeditated murder and felony murder typify this
theory. One of the earliest and most often cited cases is People v.
Sullivan.42 The New York court held that it was not improper to submit the
alternatives of premeditated and deliberate design or felony murder to the
jury, because only one crime was committed. The two theories were not inconsistent and there was sufficient evidence supporting each to justify submitting both to the jury. Thus the court concluded, "[i]t is not necessary
that a jury, in order to find a verdict, should concur in a single view of the
transaction disclosed by the evidence." 43
Numerous courts follow Sullivan in the premeditated/felony murder
situation. 44 The courts tend to state that it is enough that all members of
the jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder, regardless of
which theory they relied upon, for both premeditated and felony murder
38. Id. (citing Holland v. State, 91 Wis.2d 134,280 N.W.2d 288,288 (1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 931 (1980)).
39. 120 Kan. 763, 245 P. 102 (1926).
40. 245 P. at 103.
41. Id. at 104.
42. 173 N.Y. 122, 65 N.E. 989 (1903).
43. 65 N.E. at 989.
44. State v. Reyes, 209 Or. 595 (1956), remanded on reh'gfor recordcorrection,304 P.2d 446
(1956), 308 P.2d 182, 189-90 (1957); People v. Qisson, 56 Mich. App. 500, 224 N.W.2d
691, 694 (1974); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341,552 P.2d 931, 936 (1976); People v. Milan,
9 Cal. 3d 185, 107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956, 961-62 (1973); State v. Carothers, 84
Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d731, 737 (1974).
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result in the same criminal liability-that prescribed for first degree
murder. If the courts actually apply this principle, they are in error. The
jury is in no position to determine whether the liability imposed for first
degree murder attaches unless they first determine what the defendant
did. Perhaps the true rationale lies in the explanation of the Washington
Court of Appeals in State v. Carothers.45 As in many of the cases, the defendant was also charged with the underlying felony. The court indicated that
when the jury returns a guilty verdict on the underlying felony charge, it
indicates agreement that the felony was committed. A guilty verdict on
first degree murder may not represent a finding of premeditation. It does,
however, represent a finding of felony murder, for even those jurors who
would find premeditation must necessarily agree the murder was committed in the course of the felony which they agree the defendant committed.
On review, the Washington Supreme Court merely assumed, without
deciding, that this might be the case. 46 The courts generally have not,
however, explicitly embraced this rationale. Rather, they erroneously rely
on the proposition that since the liability is the same, agreement is not
necessary.
The same liability rationale is also relied upon in cases involving the
question of whether the defendant acted as a principal or an accomplice. 4
The courts have determined that aiding and abetting is not a means or
mode of committing the crime, 48 nor is the defendant charged with two
crimes. 49 The elements of the crime are the same for principal and accomplice., 0 The problem remains that the jury cannot find guilt unless it
determines what the defendant did and then whether that meets the
statutory requirement.
In some states, party to a crime statutes treat conspiracy the same as
accomplice liability. Thus, the same result is reached on the jury agreement
question. 51 In the federal system, the circuits are split.52 One conspiracy
count can charge conspiracy to commit more than one crime. This is a
single violation of the conspiracy statute.55 Ordinarily, the jury may convict
if it finds a conspiracy to commit any one of the enumerated crimes. 14 The
same reasoning applies where more than one overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy is alleged.5"
Mens Rea
The cases involving alternative states of mind and intent demonstrate
similar attempts to rationalize the result that the jury need not agree. As a
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

9 Wash. App. 691, 514 P.2d 170 (1973), aff'd 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974).
State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 P.2d at 737.
Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d at 292.
State v. Carothers, 525 P.2d at 738.
State v. Wixon, 631 P.2d at 1042.
State v. Wixon, 631 P.2d at 1042; State v. Carothers, 525 P.2d at 736.
Manson v. State, 304 N.W.2d 729; Holland v. State, 280 N.W.2d 288.
See generaUy, Comment, General Verdicts and Multiple-Objective Conspiracy Counts:
Complications on Review, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 593 (1982).
53. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942).
54. United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Wilkinson,
601 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. O'Looney, 544 F.2d 385, 391 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).
55. United States v. Yates, 354 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1957).
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clear proposition, mens rea is as much an element of the crime as actus
reus. The widely adopted rule is that when more than one act will satisfy
the statute, the jury needs to agree on what act the defendant did. The
logical corollary of that rule is that when more than one state of mind will
satisfy the statute, the jury must agree on which state of mind the defendant had. The California Court of Appeals has held squarely to the contrary, that there is no merit to the argument that the jury must reach
agreement on which of the alternative mens rea requirements is
present-maliciously or recklessly. 66
Other courts have sidestepped the issue by concluding that a general
felonious or bad intent is all that is necessary to satisfy the mens rea element. These courts then decide that agreement need not be reached as to
the particular manifestation of bad intent.57 In State v. Flathers,58 the
South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a murder conviction. The defendant
was charged with the killing of Frahm with intent to kill Rounds or intent
to kill Frahm.59 On appeal, the defendant claimed that part of the jury
might have found intent to kill one and part another. Thus he argued that
the instructions given permitted the jury to return a guilty verdict without
a unanimous finding as to a necessary element of the crime. 60 The court
emphasized that there was only one offense and noted there was ample
evidence to support the conclusion he intended to kill Rounds, as well as
ample evidence to support the conclusion that he intended to kill Frahm,
and therefore ample evidence to support the conclusion he intended to kill
both.61 The court relied primarily on felonious, deadly intent to satisfy the
intent element6 and declined to require unanimity as to whom that intent
was directed.
In State v. Utter,63 the defendant claimed the trial court had sanctioned
a non-unanimous verdict because the jury was not instructed it must agree
on which of the six possible ways he might have abused the child (2 acts x 3
states of mind). The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected that contention,
concluding that an alternative instruction, justified by the evidence, did not
mean the verdict was not unanimous. 64 The court may have been led astray
by the fact that "defendant's sole authority . . . is United States v.
Gipson ....,,65 which case the court construed narrowly and promptly
distinguished it from the case at bar.66 The question in such cases is not
whether the jury was unanimous in finding guilt, but whether that finding
rests on substantial agreement that all the elements of the crime have been
proved. In Utter, the actus reus element, as well as the mens r'ea element,
was stated in the alternative. The jury surely cannot agree on guilt without
56. People v. Heideman, 58 Cal. App. 3d 321, 130 Cal. Rptr. 349, 355 (1976).
57. Territory v. Rowand, 8 Mont. 110, 19 P. 595 (1888) (felonious deadly intent is material
point in homicide case).
58. 57 S.D. 320, 232 N.W.51 (1930).
59. 232 N.W. at 52.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. 92 N.M. 83, 582 P.2d 1296, 1298 (1978).
64. 582 P.2d at 1299.
65.Id.

66. Id.
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first deciding what the defendant did and then determining whether one of
the requisite states of mind existed.
In the burglary cases, for example People v. Failla, California has
followed the bad intent is enough rationale. 67 Stating that, "[tihe gravamen
of a charge of burglary is the act of entry itself,"' 68 the court concluded the
jury need not be instructed that they must all agree on what felony was intended, provided they are instructed they must all find that a felonious entry occurred.69 Clearly the California court does not consider particularized
felonious intent to be a necessary element of burglary. "[T]he crime is complete when the one accused has entered the house of another with intent to
commit any felony. ' 70 The decision rested in part on the notion that if the
entry were made with intent to commit several felonies, only one burglary
would be committed.7 The court emphasized that the statute prohibited
only one act which might be presented on different theories.7 2 Thus, the
court classified the intent the defendant had when he entered as only a
theory of the case, on which the jury need not agree, so long as the jury
agreed the entry was felonious."
The express question raised in Faitawas whether the jury need be instructed on what a felony is before they can find that the defendant intended "to commit theft or any felony."'7 4 The court found prejudicial error in
the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the definition of felony. The
state had argued that the guilty verdict should be upheld because it was
amply supported by the evidence of intent to steal. The court rejected the
opportunity to uphold the verdict on the ground that one of the alternative
intent charges was supported by the evidence. The court said it could not
uphold the verdict because it was not convinced the jury found intent to
steal, rather than intent to commit a felony, and because the evidence of intent to steal was weak.7 Evidence of intent to commit a number of felonies
was apparently ample. The question of whether the general verdict on the
alternative intent to commit theft or any felony could be sustained in the
absence of sufficient evidence to support one alternative was not addressed. The court's language indicates that any intent will suffice, but the court
did not decide, as it might have, that because one alternative intent was
supported, defects in the other alternative were irrelevant.
The Failla court remanded for a new trial because the jury had not
been instructed-what a felony was. 76 Thus the court acknowledged that the
finding of general felonious intent must be based on some sound ground,
but refused to acknowledge that it should be based on a totally sound
ground. The jury should be instructed that it must agree on at least one of
the alternatives proposed. If the jury agreed on more than one alternative
67. 64 Cal. 2d 560, 51 Cal. Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39 (1966).
68. 414 P.2d at 44.

69. Id. at 45.
70. Id. at 44 (citing People v. Morlock, 46 Cal. 2d 141, 146, 292 P.2d 897, 901 (1956)) (emphasis added).
71. 414 P.2d at 44-45 (citing People v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 597, 30 P. 7, 9 (1892)).

72. 414 P.2d at 44-45.
73. Id. at 45.
74. Id. at 41.
75. Id. at 43.

76. Id. at 43.
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intent, the defendant would not be guilty of more than one crime. Califorthat the mens rea
nia's approach has been criticized as failing to recognize
7
element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ?
While the California court hinted that the identity of the intended
felony was not an element of burglary, the Washington Court of Appeals
has squarely so held.78 The Washington court tended to agree with California that so long as the jury finds felonious entry, the general verdict is
good. 79 The rationale for this was that the identity of the underlying felony
is not an element of burglary. Thus a finding of mere criminal intent will
suffice to satisfy the mens rea element.
Regardless of whether the state classifies the identity of the intended
felony as an element of burglary which must be alleged and proved (and
many states do) the question remains how a jury can find general felonious
intent without first determining what the defendant intended. The courts
which determine that general felonious intent meets the intent requirement of the statute permit the jury to convict without substantial agreement as to what the defendant did. In those states where particularized intent is an essential element of burglary, the defendant is clearly entitled to
jury agreement in the particularized intent.
The Arizona court upheld a general verdict of guilty of theft based on
the alternative mental states with intent to deprive or knowing or having
reason to know the property was stolen.80 The court classified the case as
one involving a single offense committable in more than one way.8 1 The
court relied on the fact that the two states of mind have a readily perceived
connection, are consistent and not repugnant, and may inhere in the same
transaction. 82 It appears the Arizona court has adopted a Gipson-type test
for the state of mind element and concluded that agreement as to which
state of mind existed is not necessary when the two states of mind alleged
are not conceptually distinct.
In State v. Souhrada,88 the Montana Supreme Court affirmed a
manslaughter conviction. The bill of particulars alleged driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor or negligent driving or driving in a grossly
reckless manner or speeding. 84 The trial court had denied several instructions which would have required unanimity on the specific acts or omissions
which constituted the criminal negligence.8 8 The supreme court relied on
the Sullivan case, among others, for the proposition that the jury need not
concur in a single view of the transaction.8 6 Thus the Montana court refused to categorize the state of mind as an essential element, but rather
77. Note, Jury Instructionsand the Unanimous Jury Verdict-UnitedStates v. Gipson, 558
F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977), 1978 WIs. L. REv. 339, 348.
78. State v. Chelly, 32 Wash. App. 916,651 P.2d 759,761 (1982), reh'g denied, 651 P.2d 759
(1982).
79. 651 P.2d at 761.

80. State v. Dixon, 622 P.2d at 508.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 509.
122 Mont. 377, 204 P.2d 792 (1949).
204 P.2d at 793-94.
Id.at 796.
Id.
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classified the defendant's state of mind as a mere view of the transaction or
interpretation of the evidence. Criminal negligence can thus be proved
without agreement concerning the defendant's state of mind, even without
agreement as to what the defendant did. This runs counter to the notion
that each element of the offense must be proved. It allows mere hunches of
individual jurors to combine to reach a valid guilty verdict where there is no
agreement as to what the defendant did or with what mental state he did it.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEFECTIVE ALTERNATIVES

When alternatives of any kind are alleged, an instruction that the jury
cannot convict unless they agree that at least one alternative exists, will insure jury agreement. Complications beyond the matter of mere agreement
arise where one of the alternatives is defective in some way. A reviewing
court has no way of determining which alternative the jury found. Several
cases acknowledge that when a general verdict is returned on alternatives,
the court cannot know which alternative the jury found 87 Thus the court
cannot be sure the jury unanimously agreed on the defective nonalternative agreement, even if the jury was properly cautioned that it must
agree on at least one alternative.
A defective alternative may be discovered only after the jury has been
dismissed. This can happen when one of the alternatives is not supported
by the evidence. It can also happen if one of the alternatives is defective in
some other way. One alternative state of mind can be erroneously submitted to the jury, because the defendant admitted a culpable state of mind
higher than that alternative.18 One alternative may be an unconstitutional
presumption supporting an inference of fact. 9 One of the objective
substantive offenses of a conspiracy conviction may be held unconstitutional. 90 The statute of limitations may bar one alternative. 91 In all these
situations, one alternative is defective.
Insufficiency of the Evidence
Some courts have expressly made sufficiency of the evidence to support
both alternatives a condition of their approval of the general verdict where
alternative means are involved.92 A number of other courts which have not
expressly stated that both alternatives must be supported by substantial
evidence have approved the general verdict only where there was, in fact,
substantial evidence to support both alternatives. In many of these cases,
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the alternative means was not
that there was suffieven questioned. The courts may indicate, however,
cient evidence to support the alternatives. 9 Other courts imply that
87. People v. Nicholas, 112 Cal. App. 3d 249, 169 Cal. Rptr. 497(1980); People v. Olsson, 224
N.W.2d 691 (1974).
88. People v. Heideman, 58 Cal. A pp. 3d 321, 130 Cal. Rptr. 349, 355 (1976).
89. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.s. 510, 526 (1979).
90. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
91. United States v. Yates, 354 U.S. at 304.
92. State v. Dixon, 622 P.2d at 508; Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 610, 617 (1980);
People v. Olsson, 224 N.W.2d at 694; People v. Sullivan, 65 N.E. at 989; State v.
Hazzelett, 492 P.2d at 503.
93. People v. Nicholas, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 510 (there was "abundant proof of defendant's
specific intent to commit the robbery and murders,"); State v. Flathers, 232 N.W. at 52
(ample evidence to support the conclusion that defendant intended to kill Frahm, or that
defendant intended to kill Rounds, or that defendant intended to kill both).
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approval of the patchwork verdict is bottomed
on the assumption that the
94
alternatives are supported by the evidence.
It is a recognized principle that where alternative theories of guilt are
submitted to a jury and a general verdict of guilt is returned which does not
specify which theory the jury agreed upon, insufficiency of any alternative
submitted will be fatal to the verdict. The reason is that it is not possible to
know that the jury did not rely upon the insufficient theory in reaching its
verdict.
The Kentucky court originally endorsed the logic of People v. Sullivan
that the general verdict on alternative means would be upheld where there
was substantial evidence to support all alternatives.9 5 A few years later, in
Boulder v. Commonwealth, 96 a general verdict was returned on the alternative mens rea elements intentionally or recklessly. Only one alternative,
intentional injury, was supported by the evidence. The Kentucky court set
aside the conviction based on alternative mens rea elements, one of which
was not supported by the evidence:
The instructions submitting count one (first degree assault) to the
jury were improper. They provided alternative grounds for a finding of guilt-either that John intended to cause serious physical injury to 'Cynthia' or that he was wantonly engaging in conduct
which created a risk of death to 'Cynthia.' The state of the
evidence, however, is such that it would be clearly unreasonable for
a juror to believe that John's conduct was other than intentional.
Because we cannot ascertain that all the jurors based their decision
on the first theory, which is the only one supported by the evidence,
we cannot say the verdict was unanimous as required by RCr
9.82(1) and Wells v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 85 (1978). 7
In State v. Green, the Washington Supreme Court changed its position.
Originally, over a dissent stressing that the means involved were in
themselves separate crimes, 98 the court held that the alternatives of aggravated first degree murder in the course of a kidnapping or in the course
of a rape were means of committing the single crime of aggravated
murder.9 9 The court noted the murder could be committed in one or more
ways which were not repugnant to each other and which were supported by
substantial evidence. 100 Thus it was not error to instruct in the
94. "If the conclusion may be justified upon either of two interpretations of the evidence, the
verdict cannot be impeached by showing that a part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation and part upon another." State v. Souhrada, 204 P.2d at 796. See also State v.
Wilson, 552 P.2d at 935. Implicit in these statements is the recognition that each interretation the jury may have relied upon is supported by the evidence. See also Manson v.
tate, 304 N.W.2d at 737 (the jury needn't be instructed concerning unanimity about
"ways of committing the crime if the two ways are practically indistinguishable.") The
implication is apparent that if the methods are practically indistinguishable, evidence supporting one would also support the other.
95. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d at 88.
96. 610 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1980).
97. Id. at 617.
98. 588 P.2d at 1388 (Utter, J., dissenting).
99. 588 P.2d at 1376.
100. Id.
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alternative.10 1 On rehearing,10 2 the court decided there was not sufficient
evidence to support a finding of kidnapping.10 The court might simply have
held, as other courts have done, that in such a circumstance, the court cannot say the jury unanimously found the supported alternative, and remanded for a new trial. Instead the court retrenched on its previous position and
agreed with Justice Utter that because rape and kidnapping are separate
and distinct major crimes, as well as elements of aggravated murder, the
specific elements of rape or kidnapping must also be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt:
[T]he charge of aggravated murder in the first degree must be
established by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
caused the victim's death in the course of or in the furtherance of
While rape and kidnapping are
rape, ... , or kidnapping .....
elements of aggravated murder in the first degree, each is a
separate and distinct major crime having specific0 4elements which
also must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.1
A subissue in that case was that kidnapping could be proved by any of
four means. The court held that the four means of kidnapping (restraint by
1) secreting, 2) by threat of deadly force, 3) by use of deadly force other
than killing, 4) by killing itself) were not interchangeable, that each must be
independently proved and that none could combine to fill a void. 0 1 Because
the court found insufficient evidence of three of the alternatives and determined that restraint by killing was beyond the ken of the aggravated
murder statute, it held that kidnapping had not been proved in that case. 0 6
The court did not say whether the jury must agree on the method of
restraint, which is an element of kidnapping. It appears that even if the
jury had reached agreement on the method of restraint, the verdict would
fall because restraint by killing was an improper alternative.
In conspiracy cases, as in all others, a reviewing court cannot tell which
of the alternatives the jury found. Where one conspiracy alternative is
defective, the federal courts generally reverse on the grounds they are
10 7
unable to determine whether the jury found the proper alternative(s).
Contrary results have been reached by courts which hold that sufficient
evidence of one alternative will support the conviction.10 8 The general proposition seems well established: the jury must reach agreement on at least
one alternative before they can convict.
101. Id. at 1377.
102. 94 Wash. 2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).
103. 616 P.2d at 631.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 634.
106. Id. at 636.
107. United States v. Head, 641 F.2d 174, 178-179 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Tarnopol,
561 F.2d 466, 475 (3rd Cir. 1977); United States v. Carnan, 577 F.2d 556, 568 (9th Cir.
1973).
108. United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1402 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Tanner, 471
F.2d 128, 143 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972) (although defendants did
not commit the crime because they were outside territorial waters, they could
nonetheless conspire to commit the defective alternative act).
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Other Defects
Other defects in one alternative are similarly fatal to a general verdict.
Thus in Sandstromv. Montana,09 it was possible for the jury to have reached its verdict of guilt by two alternative approaches: either by following a
presumption as to intent, or by relying upon the evidence. On review, the
presumption was held unconstitutional. The state argued that the jury
could have found defendant guilty upon the evidence, rather than by relying upon the presumption, and therefore the verdict of guilt should be
upheld. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument:
But, more significantly, even if a jury could have ignored the
presumption and found defendant guilty because he acted knowingly, we cannot be certain that this is what they did do. As the
jury's verdict was a general one,... , we have no way of knowing
that Sandstrom was not convicted on the basis of the unconstitutional instruction. And "[i]t has long been settled that when a case
is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set
aside. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct.
532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931)." Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at
31-32. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 159-160;
175-176 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
UnitedStates, 330 U.S. at 408-409; Bollenbachv. UnitedStates, 326
U.S. at 611-614.110
Earlier Supreme Court cases also indicated that where the verdict is
based on two alternatives, one of which is defective, the general verdict
cannot stand."' It is clear that the simple instruction that the requisite
number must agree that at least one alternative exists will not solve these
types of problems.

SOLUTIONS
The threat to jury agreement posed by general verdicts on alternatives
is not without solution. Responsibility for removing the threat rests on
every participant in the process of defining and trying criminal charges.
The duty of each participant varies with his specific role in the process.
In the first instance, the solution rests with the legislature. Two approaches are available. The first approach is to draft criminal statutes
without alternatives. The difficulty arises only because the legislature has
made a practice of grouping multiple means of committing a crime in a
single statute. 1 2 The jury instructions merely convey the statutory requirements to the jury. If the statutes did not list alternative requirements,
neither would the jury instructions. In addition, some criminal statutes are
109. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
110. Id. at 526.
111. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 311-12; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. at 367-68.
112. Note, Application of Gipson's Unanimous Verdict Rational to the Wisconsin Party to a
Crime Statute-Hollandv. State, 91 Wis.2d 184, f80 N.W.2d 288 (1979), 1980 Wis. L.
REV. 597, 614.
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overly specific and this tends to complicate the situation. 113 The statute involved in the Gipson case, declaring six acts unlawful, is an example. Simple, straightforward statutes could eliminate most of the problem.
A second legislative solution is to authorize the use of special verdicts
in criminal cases. A special verdict would permit the jury to indicate which
of the presented alternatives it agreed upon. The special verdict at once
assures that the jury will reach agreement and indicates to a reviewing
court which alternative(s) the jury found. This is important when one of the
alternatives is later found to be defective in some way. By way of the
special verdict, the reviewing court will know whether the jury based its
decision on a valid or a defective alternative. If the jury based its decision
on a valid alternative, a new trial need not be ordered.
The special verdict is available in federal criminal cases. 114 These
special verdicts are especially appropriate in criminal cases where the jury
must determine the amount of interest or identify the property subject to
forfeiture. 15 However, the use of the special verdict in other contexts has
been questioned. 116 The courts are hesitant to endorse the use of special
verdicts. One basis for this is that the criminal jury's function goes beyond
factfinding. It includes the application of the law to the facts. Thus the use
of special verdicts, which focus on the factfinding element, is thought to encroach on the jury's function."l 7 The courts expect the jury to function as
the conscience of the community, and to temper the rules of law with common sense."" In contrast, special verdicts focus the jury's attention on the
legal requirements. They tend to force the jury to be more logical and less
humane." 9
Despite the criticism of the use of special verdicts in criminal cases, it is
clear that the special verdict form, allowing the jury to indicate all alternatives it found, would solve all the problems general verdicts entail. The
jury would be forced to agree on the alternatives. New trials would be
avoided where the special verdict indicates a basis for upholding the conviction even though one alternative is defective.
Even in the absence of legislative reform, the prosecutor can prevent
the jury agreement problem from arising. The prosecutor's interest in
avoiding needless new trials is clear. The prosecutor who wishes to protect
his verdict has several avenues available to him. He can exercise his
rightful discretion on matters of charging so as to eliminate the problem.
He can bring different counts for each alternative. This will ensure a verdict on each alternative.' 20 It is also within the prosecutor's discretion to
Note, supra note 77, at 343.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e).
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, FED. R. CRIM P. 31(e).
See United States v. James, 432 F.2d 303, 307-308 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
906 (1971); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 183 (lst Cir. 1969); Gray v. United
States, 174 F.2d 919, 923-924 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 848 (1949).
117. 2 WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 512 (1969 & Supp.

113.
114.
115.
116.

1981).

118. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d at 181-82.
119. Id. at 181.
120. He is sure to meet with defense objections of double jeopardy and duplicitous charges.
These are serious matters to be dealt with. However, the objective here is not to solve all
problems, but to suggest ways to avoid the general verdict difficulties.
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charge only one of the alternatives in the first place. Where charges are
lodged before the prosecutor has fully investigated his case, he might
originally charge all alternatives. Later he could strike all alternatives save
that one which is best supported. Where special verdicts are available, the
prosecutor can request special verdicts on the alternatives. These special
verdicts would operate to safeguard the verdict where one alternative is
defective. Where special verdicts are not available, the prosecutor can propose jury instructions which would require jury agrement on at least one
alternative. This will suffice to ensure jury agreement.
If neither the legislature nor the prosecutor acts to eliminate the problem, defense counsel should act. Defense counsel can move to strike an
alternative from the information at an early stage. He can also move to
amend the information to charge the alternatives in separate counts. He
can move for a directed verdict of acquittal on one alternative at the end of
the state's case. Lastly, defense counsel should propose jury instructions
requiring the jury to agree on at least one of the alternatives presented.
The trial court's duty is to help eliminate the difficulties by looking
favorably on motions to amend the information and to withdraw some
alternatives from jury consideration. These changes can prevent the question of agreement on alternatives from arising. When all else fails, the trial
court must take responsibility for insuring that the jury reaches agreement
on the alternatives presented. The trial court should instruct sua sponte on
such a basic matter as jury agreement.
The heaviest burden of all falls on the reviewing court. Some courts
have tended to avoid the issue by relegating the alternatives presented to a
status which does not require jury agreement. Perhaps this reflects a
hesitancy to look into the verdict; perhaps a reluctance to order a new trial
when one alternative may be defective or where a proper "agreement on
alternatives" instruction was not given, perhaps a fear of special verdicts
and any instructions which approach them. The reviewing court has the
solemn duty to acknowledge and confront the problems, not to avoid them.
The courts must recognize that where one alternative is defective and
special verdicts have not been used, a new trial is essential. The courts
must also encourage a proper instruction in all cases which present the jury
alternatives. In many states, the highest court has direct responsibility for
pattern jury instructions and can ensure that proper instructions are made
available. In other situations, the reviewing court is given great indirect
power over jury instructions. The source of that power is the authority to
reverse every case where a proper instruction was not given.
Jury instruction recommendations have covered a broad range. One
proposal is to amend the jury instructions to reflect the Gipsonapproach.'12
Another is to instruct the jury that they must agree on at least one alternative only when there is a risk of non-unanimity or when the alternatives
are substantially different. 122 The better solution is to instruct the jury
121. Note, aupra note 77, at 340. But this is based on the erroneous notion that Gipson extends the area of agreement the jury must reach. In fact, it does not, but has been used to
reduce the area of necessary agreement. See supra text accompanying note 21.
122. Note, supranote 112, at 611.
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whenever alternatives are presented, regardless of how those alternatives
are classified. This simple expedient will assure jury agreement in every
case.
CONCLUSION

A basic requirement of criminal jury trials is that the jury must reach
agreement. The practice of submitting alternatives to a jury not instructed
they must reach agreement on at least one alternative, allows a jury to
return a special verdict of guilty without the necessary agreement. Broad
reforms are available to insure jury agreement in such cases. Until these
reforms are accomplished, better use of the available tools will go far
toward assuring jury agreement. The currently available tools include the
prosecutor's charging discretion, judgment of acquittal, jury instructions,
and, in limited situations, special verdicts. These tools should be utilized to
mould verdicts based on jury agreement, in accord with the basic requirements of criminal jury trials.
BARBARA L. LAUER

12

3

123. The author first became interested in this topic while briefing a criminal appeal for the
Wyoming Defender Aid Program. That case has since been decided. Fife v. State, Wyo.
Sp. Ct. No. 83-132, decided February 2,1984 held that when one alternative submitted to
the jury is not supported by the evidence, the general verdict cannot stand.
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